When you cannot get a logical explanation for what is happening in front of you, then by sense and feeling, you may turn to psychology, because counter-logic movement is often based on a number of psychological accumulations and internal human conflicts that are not recognized early by analysts.
This was especially true for most of the actions of the former Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamad Al Thani, and his political decisions at home and abroad, which have not proven to be of strategic benefit to his country or even its future.
His last direct relationship with the Saudi issue tells the observers the advisability of the psychoanalytic theory of the political decision in Doha, as his recent visit to the birthplace of Al Thani in the town of Ushaiger, about 200 kilometers from Riyadh, is one of the scenes of psychological confusion that cannot be hidden.
This visit was the last scene in which the Saudis acted in good faith with Qatar and its Emir, who has big dreams. He received a high royal reception and was accompanied by Saudi helicopters to the town, which received him, as usual, with generosity and hospitality.
The visit was ostensibly simple to explain: a man with a fatal renal disease who wants to visit his family's birthplace before Allah Almighty decrees His order.
However, what was revealed by this visit has made the warning bells ring in the kingdom, and its men knew well that Hamad had not changed, and that his dreams have not stopped yet. His pledges were dubious to some of those who heard him: a donation of $1 billion that could be directed to what the townspeople want; and his pledge that his country would not leave “Tamimi," a member of the Bani Tamim tribe who wanted to move to Qatar but be surrounded by full care and attention, in addition to many temptations and in all means.
With their usual generosity and the gentleness of their high morals, the people of the Bani Tamim tribe refused their cousin's suspicious offer. And with their extreme courtesy, they fulfilled their hospitality and visitation. Then they issued a famous statement confirming there is no place for tribal fanaticism among them, and no loyalty but to the Saud family, kings, and rulers.
It was the last shot that Hamad wanted to launch in the skies of the kingdom, but it came back to him in the form of sanctions and boycotts that have put an end to Doha's international influence.
Hamad does not dream of the water of Ushaiger, which was the spring water of the Beni Tamim tribe, nor the palms of the town of Diriyah, the birthplace of the Al-Saud family and of Al-Sheikh, whom he tried to associate with but with whom they denied any connection or bond. But Hamad dreamed of the entire Arab world, as well as the Islamic faith.
Hamad believed Saudi Arabia was his real prize and the crown jewel in his rule. Qatar, with its limited space and its small population, could not satisfy his great dreams. Since the early years of his country's reign after a coup against his father, his eyes looked there, past the borders, and to Saudi Arabia in particular.
Hamad looked for loopholes in which to establish a Qatari presence in the kingdom, and he tried all soft means: encouraging Al Thani to buy farms in Al-Ahsa; Qatari investments everywhere; and links with a number of cultural, artistic, and sports figures as well as opinion-makers.
The peak reached the idea of forming a strong Saudi lobby in the kingdom, which he then worked on establishing quietly. Some people joined with a desire for getting a place in the future. Others ignorantly joined him with insufficient awareness of the consequences.
Hamad and his team, specialized in the Saudi file, have harnessed all their country's potential to attract Saudis or form links, especially financial and practical, with them.
The idea of the two Hamads was to prepare the climate for revolution in the kingdom by spreading a culture of frustration, creating stars that owe allegiance to Doha, and to attract influential community leaders from any stream to lead public opinion and use it when the appropriate moment comes.
It came to direct negotiations between Hamad bin Jassem and a number of influential Islamic clerics without barriers, and Doha tried in an exposed way to obtain the rights of the Saudi football league through an intermediary who is a very famous cleric. He led the negotiations enthusiastically, but these negotiations failed in the end.
Those moments were frightening and very strange. Just trying to praise any Saudi government decision means collision with waves roaring from critics and cynics. This was part of the revolution industry, and Qatar knew its sciences and distributed academies in a number of Arab countries in order to attract young people, especially Saudis, to indoctrinate them into their ideals and market these ideas inside Saudi Arabia.
The two Hamads' plan was very clear: creating a climate of dissatisfaction with the Saudi government; controlling Twitter, the biggest influence for the Saudis; and attracting some of its stars and leaders. As I said, some are driven by the chaos of change and ideology while others are unknowingly driven.
Some have received huge sums for tasks that do not look ugly. Lectures, seminars, articles, and hosting, all of which are paid more than the offered work deserves, and some have the same dreams—as in the head of Hamad Al Thani.
The scene was absurd to this Saudi-Qatari lobby, which became exposed: One advocate received huge sums for lectures at a mosque, and completed them through Skype when he was banned from traveling. Another advocate received huge sums in exchange for intermittent lectures at a Qatari university. And many more like that. Doha and its officials' contacts with a number of preachers have not been cut off in order to recruit or contain young people until the moment comes.
Doha did not leave anything on the land of Saudi Arabia but tried to exploit it to prepare a climate of revolution and maximize popular discontent: minorities, clubs, players, serials that broadcast utopian ideas about justice and Islamic rule, and television programs aimed at spreading freedom at all costs.
These ideas are allowed in the whole world except... in Doha.
The two Hamads had undisputed certainty that the moment of the kingdom’s fall was coming, and it must be exploited. They spent billions on these dreams. Qatar could have had its streets encrusted with diamonds, in terms of size, number, and resources, without the adventures of the two Hamads in all parts of the earth. You cannot control the world, when you cannot provide milk and food to less than half a million citizens.
Qatar received a deadly hit after the courageous decision to boycott it, which was resolutely led by King Salman. It was necessary to put a point on the line. Doha is no longer able to play in all playgrounds or wear just about every hat. It shrank into its own borders and returned to its natural position.
As a simple researcher in international relations, I believe that the boycott of Qatar was the most important strategic decision of Saudi Arabia during the last decade. It is the country that has really sought, with long-term plans, to destroy the largest entity on the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab and Muslim world.
The live broadcast of Al-Jazeera, Qatar's most powerful tool, of the arrival of 3,000 cows shows the extent to which Doha was reached by the boycott.
Qatar is now paying for the psychological state of former Emir Hamad Al Thani. The intellectual and political confusion, in his imagination, is due to the struggle of heroes and roles in his perceptions.
Hamad dreams of being Omar ibn al-Khattab, Khalid bin al-Walid, Abdul Aziz bin Saud, Gamal Abdel Nasser, al-Qaqa'a ibn 'Umar, and Jifara, but the bitter truth is that after all these years, Hamad could not be anybody but Hamad... only Hamad no more.